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CONCLUSIONS
1. The scientific value of a sample returned from Mars would be very
high. The most desirable kind of sam ple would be one that is kept
intact and not altered by heat, radiation or chemical treatment
before return.
2. Some scientists strongly argue against now actively considering
the return of an unsterilized sample. The bioscience community is
widely divided on the back contamination issue and the expressed
intent to return an unsterile sample would very likely precipitate
a widespread and public debate on the issue. The attitude of the
regulatory agencies is conservative and they are not likely to
regard lightly the back contamination hazard. 1
 The international
implications have not been thoroughly explored, although clearly,
there is international interest.
3. It is possible to plan the return of a sterile sample from Mars to
the Earth. In order to accomplish this, considerable research needs
to be done. For example, what is an acceptable sterilization mode
for the sample? The sterilization procedure must be evaluated as
to its ability to kill terrestrial organisms while doing the least
damage to the scientific content of the sample. These two objectives
are to some extent divergent; however, a compromise solution seems
attainable. This is an area where considerable work must be done.
Although dry 'feat treatment was the method of choice for spacecraft
sterilization, other methods (wet heat, heat and radiation, radiation,
chemical treatment, etc.) may be more suitable for this purpose. Two
research programs will be needed if we proceed. 1) The effectiveness
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of various sterilization methods for killing organisms in soil, and
2) The effect of these techniques on the inorganic, organic, and
biological information in that soil.
4. The least expensive and simplest mission mode for returning a Mars
sample to Earth is the direct entry mode. In this case the sample
is lifted from Mars to Mars orbit, transferred to the orbiting return
vehicle and returned directly to the Earth where it could be put
into orbit or brought directly to the surface. The sample container
is contaminated externally and in the process of transfer, the
return spacecraft is contaminated internally in the sample holding
area. Present design studies have not yet resolved the problem of
sterilization of the return spacecraft and container or of achieving
a sterile transfer of the sample container. This problem must be
solved before return to Earth or Earth orbit can be considered.
S. The Viking mission to Mars must be considered to be the beginning
of Martian exploration. While it has as one of its objectives the
search for life, it should by no means be considered capable of
determining unequivocally the presence or absence of life. If life
is present on Mars Viking has a reasonable chance of detecting it -
it cannot possibly prove the absence of life. The life detecting
ability of Viking is the best that can be designed on the basis
of our present limited knowledge of Mars. Additional spacecraft,
of the Viking class, can add appreciably to our store of tnowledge
about Mars and its potential for life, so that in time, an unsterile
sample return might be feasible. In the event that life is found on
Mars, additional Viking class spacecraft can begin the task of
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characterizing that life and assessing to some degree the hazard
such life might pose for the Earth.
1. Although it was not discussed at the meeting, it has been suggested
that the regulatory agencies would require containment of the sample
behind major quarantine barriers since sterility of a returned sample,
even after extensive sterilization treatment, could not be demonstrated.
In other words, containment procedures would be the same for unsterile
or sterilized samples.
Short Suirmary
Regulatory agencies involved with the importation of biological
material will probably require the construction of major quarantine
barriers if the absence of a biohazard in a returned Martian sample
cannot be demonstrated.
Preliminary mission analysis indicates that the probability of
uncontrolled impact upon return of a sample to earth is high. Analysis
of the mode of a sterilized sample return is incomplete in both the
biological and hardware aspects.
The effect of a dry heat sterilization procedure on inorganic
materials would be minimal if temperatures were kept below 250°C.
Potential organic geochemistry data would suffer, probably in an
assessable manner, if sterilization were effected at temperatures
above 15000. Morphological biological analysis would be strongly
degraded in most heating regimes. However, the use of fixative agents
which can also act as sterilants, may offer a hope of salvaging some
biological data from sterile samples.
Support for the return of an unsterile sample was expressed with
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the consideration that the chances of internction between a Martian and
terrestrial biology are so remote as to be highly improbable. This
view was opposed by one which suggests that the probability, while low,
must• be measured against the values at stake; hence stringent precautions
must be observed.
A consensus seemed to be arrived at suggesting that if sterility
of the sample could be assured with maximum retention of inorganic and
organic geochemical information, the mission would be of high value and
of great scientific importance, yet with minimum risk to terrestrial
values. If biological information could be retained, the value of the
mission would be markedly increased.
The major questions to be solved appear to be based upon the biological
problem of sterility, a total assessment of the effect of heating an
organic and inorganic geochemistry, and a thorough examination of
techniques for sterilizing the Earth-entry package and for recovery of
the return package on Earth.
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INTRODUCTION
A symposium was convened on OcLuber 24-25, 1973 at the Amen Research
Center to dtscuss various technical and scientific aspects of a Mars
Surface Sample Return (MSSR) mission. Particular attention was focused
on the question of back-contamination. The purpose of the meeting was to
sample the opinions cf the scientific community on MSSR, to define some
of the problems inherent in the back contamination issue and return
sample missions, and to highlight areas where, additional research was
needed, in order to be able to react to a aenision on pursuing an MSSR
mission. It was assumed that such a mission is scientifically desireable
and feasible in concept.
The agcoda for the symposium is shown in Attachment I. The invited
participants (Attachment II) were carefully selected to represent all
aspects of thought on a MSSR mission: engineers and scientists, NASA
personnel and University scientists, NASA grantees a-0 independents,
geoscientists and bioscientists, and arguments for both sides of the
question of the risk of back-contamination. The following is a brief
discussion of the two-day symposium.
Acknowledgement: We would like to express our appreciation to Professor
Thomas Jukes, who had the foresight to record the presentations.   
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PI.ANETAR11 QUARANTINE REQUIREMENTS
r he government agencies responsLble for quarantine policy are the
Center for Disease Control, Department of Agriculture, and the Depart-
ment of the Interior. In addition, the World Health Organization and
COSPAR have an impact on such decisions. The position of the govern-
mental organizations with regard to the introduction of any biological
material into the United States is, ;.n general, the following; If the
absence of a biohazard cannot be demonstrated, all precautions must be
tztken. The return of a Martian sample falls under these constraints and
therefore presents the problem of beak-contamination. Prevention of
back-contamination is accomplished through quarantine techniques,
essentially the construction of partial or complete barriers.
Part of the quarantine progrnm must be an assessment of the risks
of contamination during all phases of the process of sample return
including the development of analysis Techniques for automated sample
package insertion, containment and sealing, and methods of fail-safe
container sterilization.
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MISSION OPTIONS
MSSR mission opportunities exist in 1981, 1983/84, and 1986 which
would titilixu existing launch vehicles or Nhuttle combinations depending
spun the mission. At Mars, options exist for direct descent, or descent
from orbit, and for direct ascent to a parking orbit around Mars or to
a Mars orbital rendezvous. Return to Earth can be accomplished by
direc, entry or orbital capture. All of these missions have in common
an approximate 1000 day timeline, dictated by a 400 day stay on the
Martian surface or in orbit in order to ensure a low energy return
tra}ectory. Such a timeline allows sufficient opportunity for science
testing and/or sterilization activities during the mission, should such
inclusions be desired.
The results of the joint LaRC/JPL Mars Sample Return Study were
summarized. This study was described as a "pre-phase A" effort to
determine the engineering requirements for a minimum mission to return
a nominal 200 gm sample. The rest of such a mission was estimated at
$600 M, and this figure excluded any science on the Martian surface or
in transit, sterilization of the sample, retrieval from Earth orbit,
storage in an orbiting lab, Earth-based containment facilities, or
procedures for returning an unsterilized sample in an uncontaminated
vehicle.
Each of the possible mission modes at Mars or in the vicinity of
Earth has its own set of manuvers which can result in contamination of
the Earth return capsule and associated vehicles.
Current engineering activity involves a conceptual study to analyze
the feasibility of rendezvous and docking in Mars orbit, and the sterile
transfer of samples from the lander to return spacecraft.
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RISK
In the event that direct Earth entr}, of an unsterilized sample (in
a capsule whose exterior is uncontaminated) is chosen as a mission
design, a reliability analysis was described which analyzed risks
associated with failures in return guidance nvaneuvers, separation, and
deflection of bus and capsule, and capsule failure upon re-entry. In
sumo+ary, this analysis showed that the probability for back-contamination,
defined as unhindered access of unsterilized surfaces to the terrestrial
envit..mment was high, 1 chance in 100 if the bus-deflection option was
chosen (a less complex design) and 1 chance in 10,000 for the capsule-
deflection mode (a more complex design). This risk can be greatly
reduced by designing a spacecraft sterilization technique, sterile sample
transfer technique or by redesign of the spacecraft to include features
providing greater engineering reliability in the system, All of these
would, of course, increase the cost.
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EFFECTS OF STERILIZATION
(1) On inorganic data
Data were reported on the effect of dry heat sterilization using
common rock models, such as are found on Earth or in lunar samples. The
data indicate that serious degradation of information would occur if the
sample were heated above 30000, but that heating at lower temperatures
would preserve considerable data. In general, the lower the temperatures
employed for sterilization, the more information preserved. Among the
types of events which occur, to varying extents, during heating are
volatilization of water and of some elements such as sulfur, possible phase
changes; loss of gases, and contamination by the containment vessel. At
low sterilization temperatures (below 300 00) the scientific value of the
sample is nearly unaltered, and the inclusion of differential thermal
analysis capabiV.ties and n trap fur volatiles would assure those which
could be obtained from the sample during and after sterilization..
(2) On organic data
Three physico-chemical processes of organic materials, volatilization,
chemical reaction and racemization would be influenced by sterilization
regimes. These processes would have different effects depending upon
whether the organics were absorbed on the sample as small molecules,
were present as polymers, or alternatively were implanted in the sample.
Except for implanted species, heating to 400 00 would cause severe degradation
of sample information. At 2500C for 1 hour, about 10% of the polymeric
material would be degraded and volatilized and extensive chemical reactions
would occur. Adsorbed molecules would be nearly completely volatilized
or lost by chemical reactions. Racemization of amino acids, if present,
would be complete.	 At 2000C, about 70%, of the
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small adsorbed organics would be volatilized, but only a small degree
of chemical reaction would occur. Polymeric material would be little
affected by the treatment but racemization could be extensive. The
above analysis was done at 10- (3 	 At standard pressure, but in a
nitrogen atmosphere, an examination was made of the effect of heating
at 1960 for 24 hr on the racemization of amino acids. A comparison was
made between the effects on free amino acids and those bound in a matrix
of a meceorite. The results suggest that racemization is restrained by
inclusion of the amino acid in a matrix and that considerable variation
in rate occurs dependent upon the structure of the amino acid.
It was stressed that the amount of data available from a sample
after heating could be increased significantly by the use of a trap for
volatiles during the heating process. Suggested traps included coldtraps
and chemical sequestering methods.
(3) On biology
Preliminary experiments have been carried out in order to assess the
biological value of a sterilized sample. Various s'erilization regimes
were applied to terrestrial samples and the degree of data loss was
found to be highly dependent upon the method used. Electron microscopy
was used as the detection device. When samples are heated to 200 00 for
24 hours in air there are essentially no surviving biological structures
that are recognizable. Heating at 160 0C for 3 hr does not sterilize
the sample, but some cells, membranes, and congealed cytoplasmic
material remained. Standard autoclaving (121 0C 120 min., two cycles)
does sterilize the sample and structural survivability is about as
above. Since electron microscopy was used for sample observation, two
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established methods of sample fixation wore examined as sterilizing
agents. Glutaraldehyde treatment combined with heating to about 900C
and treatment with osmium tetroxide were both very effective sterilants
and, as expected, resulted in significant preservation preservation of
biological structure.
Two disadvantages of optical techniques for biological characterization
are the requirement for large numbers of cells in the sample and the
difficulty associated with identifying biological entities in a background
of soil debris. However, preservation by chemical fixation combined with
characterization by electron microscopy can lessen these disadvantages.
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ARGUMENTS FOR RETURN OF AN UNSTERILIZED SAMPLE
One suggested mode of sample return is direct, unsterilized intro-
duction of the material to the Earth. An argument supporting this type
of return is based upon two lines of evidence; 1, the functioning of
the evolutionary procee p observed on Earth, and 2, the fact that evolution
of many hoot -parasite relationships have developed in concert. Considering
the enormous number of variations of RNA and DNA sequences passible as
a result of evolution, it is highly improbable that by pure coincidence
a Martian infectious agent similar to a virus could invade and multiply
In n terrestrial host, in which the requirement for specific proteins
an nucleic acid sequences could be met. Host-specific bacterial or
protozoological infections could be similarly ruled out. Non-specific
terrestrial infectious agents could be easily contained by routine
quarantine techniques.
Another argument offered in support of the position that the hazard
to terrestrial life of returned vigble Martian organisms would be
negligible was based on the large diiferences between Earth and Mara
of three biologically important environmental parameters: partial
pressure of oxygen, average temperature, and water activity.
A probability equation was advanced which proposed that the chances
of a "Mars plague" occurring on Earth following unsterilized sample
return was equal to the probability that organisms exist on Mara, times
the probability that these organisms could survive on Earth, times the
probability that these organisms would be infective to terrestrial life
forms. The probability of organisms existing on Mars was assumed to
be 1, based on the presumption that a sample return mission would not
be attempted without prior evidence that life exists on Mars. The
probability that such organisms would be 'infective on Earth, if
^--kL- _ . .,.
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they survived, was estimated to be a conservative 1.0 -3 , The probability
that Martian organisms would survive on Earth was proposed to be 10-6
(which also happens to be the probability that terrestrial organisms
would grow on Mare) based on the wide differences in environmental con-
ditions between Earth and Mars. For example, the partial pressure of
oxygen in the Earths atmosphere is 40,000 fold higher than in Mars'. On
Earth there has been strong evolutionary pressure for oxygen tolerance,
and partial pressures of oxygen only 50 times higher than ambient
are lethal for terrestrial organisms . Similarly, the average tempera-
ture on Mars is some BOOK cooler than Earth. One can speculate as to
the fate of life on Earth 'f the temperature was suddenly increased
by BOOK. Finally, the activity of water on Mars is estimated to be
about 3 orders of magnitude lower than the lowest water activity at
which terrestrial microorganisms grow; and terrestrial experience shows
that high water activities are lethal for microorganisms adapted to
live at low activities.
The product of these probabilities, therefore, is 10 -9 ; and these
probabilities were proposed as being on the conservative side,
4
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST RETURN OF AN UNSTERILIZED SAMPLE
As an argument against direct unsterilized sample return it was
pointed out that Martian organisms would probably have evolved quite
different proteins and cell wall materials than terrestrial organisms;
and that, if such were the case, potential parasites would not be recog-
nized either by the specific immune systems which Earth organisms have
evolved, or by the general defense systems, such as lysozyme. Many
parasitological situations observed on Earth are not the result of
long term co-evolving parasitism, but rather result from the accidental,
or adventitious, invasion of a host. Several examples of such adventitious
parasitism were mentioned, including tropical sprue, possibly caused
by an alga, aspergilosio, fungal infections involving toxin release
as well as the toxins released by anaerobic bacteria during infection.
In additional support of the view that an unsterile sample should
not be returned directly to Earth were the following points: It is
difficult, and may be impossible, to detect pathogens, either because
we cannot recognize them because of non-commonality, or because they
take too long to develop. Even though Martian and terrestrial genomes
may be totally different there is a chance that the genomes would inter-
act, and furthermore, the more similar the genomes, the more likely the
presence of enzymes able to attack components of terrestrial cells.
Assuming again similarity of genomes, it was suggested that Martian
selection pressures would be quite different from those on Earth and
that the possibility exists of altered selection pressures which could
result in long-term pathogenicity as evolutionary adaptation occurred.
Finally, it was stated that it is impossible on the basis of present
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Itnowledke to evnlunto the probnhlllty of pathogenicity and that in auch
it situnLion it would be beat not Lo return an unsLer.i'le sample. Numerical
and statistical methods were used to demonstrate the dangers of a catas-
trophic event which could result from a mistake in judgment.
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SUGGESTED EXPERIMENTS
During the course of the two day symposium, it became apparent that
there are a number of areas where laboratory research is needed in order
to clarify some of the issues raised and to generate a data base from
which important decisions could be made. They are listed below and in
no particular priority. This listing is incomplete in the sense that it
does not include the engineering assessments and related studies, or
quarantine rink analyses, Emphasis here is on experiments required to
elucidate some of the open scientific questions.
1. Efficiency of current biological barrier systems.
2. The effect of heat, chemical or radiation treatment:
A. a, on biological information preservation
b, on inorganic and organic information preservation
c. on biological killing
B. The time - treatment reciprocity on killing and
the preservation of scientific information
C. The synergistic relationships of:
a, chemical combinations
b, chemical and heat combinations
c. humidity and heat relationships to preservation
of science content
d. humidity and heat relationships to killing,
3. Use of dry heat:
A. Minimum temperature for all science
B. Effect on biological structure
C. Effect of gas pressure and composition on all
science and on killing
16 -
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h. Techn,-dies for poaaible use during sterLllzr,tion:
A. Inclusion of differential thermal analysis (DTA)
B. Use of a water trap
C. Use of a trap for organics and prevention of
movement of organisms into traps
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ATTACHMENT 1
AGENDA
MARS SAMPLE RETURN SYMPOSIUM
I. Introduction
The Problems R.S. Young
II. Quarantine
From Mars with Safety L. Hall
III. Effects of Sterilization
a. On Inorganic Data E. King
b. On Organic Data J. Hayes
K. Kvenvolden
c. On Biology E. Casida
IV. Back Contamination
Arguments for Unsterilized T. Jukes
Sample Return N. Horowitz
Arguments Against Unsterilized J. Danielli
Sample Return J. Lederberg
V. Mission Options
a. Options J. Moore
b.	 Reliability B. Swenson
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ATTACHMENT I
FINAL AGENDA
MARS SAMPLE RETURN PROBLEMS
24 October 9s00A.M. - Amea Research Center
Building #239 - Basement Conference
Room
Tel. 415-965-5000
Introduction
a. "From Mars With Love" - Problems 	 - Young - 15 min.
be Why are we all here?	 - Young - 15 min.
Quarantine
a. From Mars With Safety
	 Hall - 15 min.
III.
IVs
Mission options ( how to get from there to here)
a. Directly home	 - Moore15 min
be Meeting with shuttle sortie lab. 	 - Moore
ce Reliability	 - Swenson - 5 min.
Effects of sterilization on sample science
a. Inorganic	 - King - 20 min.,
be Organic	 - Haye s - 20 min.
ce Biology - Morphology $ Biochemistry	 - Casida - 20 mine
V.	 Back contamination
as Why we shou%d worry about back contamination -
Lederberg - 15 min.
As Pathogenicit y
	
	- Danielli - 15 mine
be Why we should nkvt worr; about back contamination -
Horowitz - 15 min.
a. Evhlution of Pathogenicity	 - Jukes - 15 min.
VIe
	
Questions and answers	 - Young
a. Is sterilization of samples necessary?
a. Why?
be Why not?
be What is the best method?
If it is heat - what temperature?
ce What is an acceptable mode for non-sterile re
as What guarantee do we need that:
1, spacecraft won't crash?
2. container won't split?
3. barrier system won't leak?
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TENTATIVE; AGENDA
MARS SAMPIX RHTURN PROBLEMS
7h October 9:00 A.M. - Amon Roeuarch Center
Bullding #239 - Basement Conference Room
1. Introduction
it. "Prom Mars With Love" - Problems - Young - 15 min.
b. Why are we all here? - Young -	 5 min.
II. Quarantine
a. The historical perspective -Epidemiology - Hall - 15 min.
b. Pathogenicity - Danielli - 15 min.
c. Bureaucracy at its worst (rules and
regulations) - Hall	 - 10 min.
d. The world problem (COSPAR) - Hall	 - 10 min.
e. How to kill microorganisms - Bond	 - 20 min.
f. How sterile is sterile ( time vs. ,".emperatures) -Bond	 - 20 min.
III. Mission options (how to get from there to here)
a. Directly home - Moore- i5 min.
b. Meeting with shuttle sortie lab - Moore-
c. Reliability - Swenson - 5 min.
IV. Effects of sterilization on sample science
a. Inorganic - King	 - 20 min.
b. Organic - Hayes - 20 min.
c. Biology - Morphology, Biochemistry - Casida- 20 min.
V. a. Why we should worry about back contamination - Lederberg - 15 min.
b. Why we should not worry about back
contamination - Horowitz - 15 min.
VI. Questions and answers - Young
a. Is sterilization of samples necessary?
a.	 Why?
b.	 Why not?
b. What is the best method" as
If it is heat - what temperature? required
c. What is an acceptable mode for non-sterile return?
a.	 What guarantee do we need that:
1. spacecraft won't, crash?
2. container won't split?
3. barrier system won't leak?
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